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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - CHARGE OF RAPE BY SEXUAL
INTERCOURSE SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT OF RAPE BY DEVIATE SEXUAL
ACTIVITY UNDER THE ARKANSAS RAPE STATUTE. Cokeley v. State,
288 Ark. 349, 705 S.W.2d 425 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 195
(1986).
On July 26, 1984, Dickie Cokeley offered nineteen-year-old
Michelle Hawkins a ride home. Rather than taking her home, Cokeley
drove to a parking lot and forced Hawkins to engage in sexual inter-
course and perform fellatio. On August 10, 1984, Cokeley was charged
by information with rape by forcible sexual intercourse. Cokeley was
tried for rape in the Circuit Court of Miller County, Arkansas. The
State presented evidence at trial relating to both forcible sexual inter-
course and forcible deviate sexual activity. Cokeley testified that Haw-
kins had voluntarily performed fellatio, but that no sexual intercourse
had occurred.
The court instructed the jury on both rape by forcible sexual inter-
course and rape by deviate sexual activity. Cokeley objected to the in-
struction regarding deviate sexual activity, but the court overruled his
objection. The jury returned a general verdict finding Cokeley guilty of
rape and sentenced him to forty years in the Arkansas Department of
Corrections.
Cokeley appealed, contending that since the State charged him
with only one offense and presented evidence of two offenses, the jury
may have convicted him of an offense with which he was not charged,
and thus violated his due process rights guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment. The Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the conviction. Ex-
pressly overruling its holding in Clayborn v. State," the court held that
rape under section 41-1803 of the Arkansas Statutes Annotated is one
offense with two means of commission. Cokeley v. State, 288 Ark. 349,
705 S.W.2d 425 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 195 (1986).
At early common law, indictments were considered insufficient if
they did not conform strictly to established technicalities.2 The com-
mon law required pleadings to contain a full statement of the facts and
the legal theory of the charge to assure that the grand jury understood
the indictment.8 These common law pleading technicalities were also
1. 278 Ark. 533, 647 S.W.2d 433 (1983).
2. 2 C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 256 (1975).
3. 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.2(d) (1984).
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used by judges to avoid imposing the death penalty for only minor of-
fenses.4 As criminal laws were codified and the number of capital of-
fenses decreased, these technicalities were not longer deemed necessary
and legislative reforms were enacted to liberalize pleading
requirements.8
This liberalization, however, was limited by the defendant's consti-
tutional right to receive fair notice. The sixth amendment to the
United States Constitution provides that a criminal defendant is enti-
tled to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.7 In early decisions, the Supreme Court construed this to mean
that in all criminal cases the pleadings must clearly and accurately de-
scribe the offense charged.8 The fourteenth amendment,9 upon passage,
extended fair notice requirements to the states.10
In United States v. Simmons" the Supreme Court again analyzed
pleading requirements, and stated that the defendant is entitled to a
"substantial statement" of the grounds upon which he is charged.
However, this may not be carried so far as to defeat the ends of jus-
tice.13 When the particular means used are not substantial elements of
the offense, the means do not have to be included in the pleadings. 4
The Court stated that when the offense is purely statutory, it is gener-
ally sufficient to charge the offense in the words of the statute.15 How-
ever, an indictment that follows the words of the statute must apprise
the defendant with reasonable certainty of the nature of the accusation
against him, so as to enable the defendant to prepare a defense and
plead judgment as a bar to subsequent prosecution for the same of-
fense. 16 Following the standard it had set forth in Simmons,17 the
4. Id.
5. Id.'
6. Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW § III, Ch. 15 (2d ed. 1983).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall ... be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation ......
8. United States v. Cook, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 168, 174 (1872); United States v. Mills, 32
U.S. (7 Pet.) 138, 142 (1833).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
10. Cole, 333 U.S. at 201.
11. 96 U.S. 360 (1877).
12. Id. at 364.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 362-63.





Court held in a subsequent case that a charge following the words of
the statute is insufficient if the words themselves do not fully and cer-
tainly set forth all the elements of the offense. 8
In Hagner v. United States 9 the Court established a test for cer-
tainty in the pleadings.20 The Court stated that the true test is not
whether the pleadings can be made more certain, but whether they
contain the elements of the offense, sufficiently apprise the defendant of
what he must be prepared to meet, and allow the defendant to plead
judgment in bar to subsequent prosecutions for the same offense."1
When the defects in the pleadings are only formal and nonprejudicial,
the defects should be disregarded.22
Three years later in Berger v. United States,'3 the Court held that
pleading defects that affect the defendant's substantial rights are fa-
tal.' 4 The defendant's substantial rights are: To be informed of the
charges so that he may be able to prepare a defense, to avoid being
taken by surprise or being prejudiced by the evidence presented at trial,
and to be protected from another prosecution for the same offense. 15
Supreme Court decisions have clearly established that a defendant
may not be charged with one offense and convicted of another. . In
Stromberg v. California7 the Court held that when a defendant is
charged with more than one offense under a particular statute and is
convicted by a general verdict, the verdict may not stand if any of the
18. United States v. Carli, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1881) (complaint held to be defective because
it did not allege that the defendant had knowledge that the instrument was forged, where knowl-
edge was an essential element under the statute).
19. 285 U.S. 427 (1932).
20. Id. at 431. Although the indictment in Hagner did not specifically allege that a letter was
delivered by the postal service, the facts alleged created this presumption.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 432.
23. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
24. Id. at 82 (where defendant was charged with only offense of conspiracy, proof as to two
conspiracies was not prejudicial).
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 96 (1940). In Thornhill, the state, follow-
ing the words of the statute, charged the defendant with loitering, interfering with a lawful busi-
ness, and picketing. The defendant's conviction was held invalid after the picketing provision of
the statute was declared unconstitutional. See also Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960)
(Hobbs Act contains two essential elements: interference with interstate commerce and extortion.
Conviction was invalid because indictment did not sufficiently charge the defendant with interfer-
ing with interstate commerce); Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948) (when evidence and in-
structions at trial pertained to § 2 of the statute, defendant could not be convicted of a separate
offense under § I of same statute).
27. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
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statutory offenses are declared unconstitutional. 8 This is because it
cannot be determined upon which offense the defendant was
convicted.2 9
The Court in Thornhill v. Alabama,3 0 following its holding in
Stromberg, stated that a court may not go behind the face of a plead-
ing to determine whether the evidence will support a conviction
founded upon different or more precise charges.3' The Court in a later
case held that a defendant may not be charged with one offense under
a particular section of a statute and be convicted of a separate offense
under another section of that statute, even if the evidence will support
such a conviction.8 2 This is true even in cases in which the state could
obtain a valid conviction by drawing the pleadings in general terms and
then showing that either offense occurred.33
The legality of an amendment to an information in state court is
primarily a matter of state law.4 In 1937, the Arkansas legislature
enacted Initiated Act No. 3, which liberalized pleading requirements in
Arkansas. The Act provides that the pleadings may be amended as to
matters of form so long as the amendment does not change the nature
or degree of the crime. 5 The Arkansas Supreme Court has construed
the Act and has held that it is designed to simplify procedure and elim-
inate technical difficulties that in the past have allowed defendants to
escape punishment."
Section 22 of the Act also provides that there is no requirement in
Arkansas that the information include the act or acts constituting the
offense unless the offense cannot be charged without doing So.37 If a
defendant needs further information, he may request a bill of particu-
lars.88 The Arkansas Supreme Court has interpreted this section to
28. Id. at 367-68.
29. Id.
30. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
31. Id. at 96.
32. Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. at 196, 201-02 (1948).
33. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960).
34. United States ex rel. Wojtycha v. Hopkins, 517 F.2d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 1975).
35. 1937 Ark. Acts No. 3, § 24 (codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1024 (1977)). See Leflar,
The Criminal Procedure Reforms of 1936-Twenty Years After, 1I ARK. L. REV. 117, 130 (1957).
36. Underwood v. State, 205 Ark. 864, 866, 171 S.W.2d 304, 305 (1943).
37. 1937 Ark. Initiated Acts No. 3, § 22 (codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. 43-1006 (1977))
provides: "[T]he name of the offense charged in the indictment shall carry with it all such
allegations."
38. 1937 Ark. Act No. 3, § 22 (codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1024 (1977)) provides that
the defendant may file a motion for a bill for particulars. A bill of particulars is a statement of
facts apprising the defendant of the specific crime charged. The granting of a bill of particulars is
governed by the discretion of the trial court and may be properly denied where the information
400 [Vol. 9:397
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mean that the information is sufficient if it does not prejudice the de-
fendant's substantive rights.3 9
Arkansas courts have recently been asked to determine the suffi-
ciency of informations in rape cases after the passage of its new rape
statute.40 In 1976, Arkansas changed its rape statute to include "devi-
ate sexual activity." 41 Under the new statute, rape may be committed
by either forcible sexual intercourse or forcible deviate sexual activ-
ity.42 The previous distinction between rape4s and forcible sodomy44 is
no longer recognized. Rape by deviate sexual activity now warrants the
same punishment as rape by sexual intercourse."
In 1981, the Arkansas Supreme Court first decided whether the
State may present evidence of deviate sexual activity when the infor-
mation charges the defendant with rape by sexual intercourse. 46 The
court allowed the evidence to be entered, citing section 43-1006 of the
Arkansas Statutes Annotated, which allows an information to charge
under the title of a statute without alleging the facts. 7
In contrast, the court later held in Clayborn v. State," that rape
by deviate sexual activity and rape by sexual intercourse are two differ-
ent crimes.49 The court determined that when an information charges
rape by deviate sexual activity, a jury instruction as to rape by sexual
intercourse is a violation of due process within the United States Su-
preme Court's holding in Thornhill v. Alabama.50 The court reasoned
that the two kinds of rape are different offenses since they are not of
the same general character.5 1 The essential elements differ because
rape by forcible sexual intercourse is restricted to heterosexual activity
while rape by deviate sexual activity is gender neutral.52 To support its
itself sets out all of the relevant facts. See Leflar, supra note 35, at 130.
39. Davis v. State, 196 Ark. 721, 722, 119 S.W.2d 527, 528 (1938).
40. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1803 (1977 & Supp. 1985).
41. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1803 (1977 & Supp. 1985) provides in pertinent part: "Rape. (1)
A person commits rape if he engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity with another
person: (a) by forcible compulsion .
42. Id.
43. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-3401 (1977) defines rape as "the carnal knowledge of a female
forcibly and against her will."
44. PoPE's DIGEST § 3428 (1937) defined sodomy as a "crime against nature."
45. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1803 (1977 & Supp. 1985).
46. Browning v. State, 274 Ark. 13, 16, 621 S.W.2d 688, 689 (1981).
47. Id.
48. 278 Ark. 5 3, 647 S.W.2d 433 (1983).






holding, the court relied on the Arkansas rape statute," which defines
deviate sexual activity and sexual intercourse separately.65
Justice Hickman dissented in Clayborn, reasoning that due process
does not require the state to specify both means of rape where no
prejudice to the defendant will result.55 He argued that the underlying
intent of the Arkansas rape statute is to define and make punishable a
physical violation.56 Justice Hickman stated that it was an outrage to
allow defendants to escape punishment on a pleading technicality when
the evidence shows that a rape has occurred by either means.57 He fur-
ther reasoned that if a defendant needs more specificity, he may re-
quest a bill of particulars.6 8
Without expressly overruling Clayborn, the Arkansas Supreme
Court has declined to follow that holding in its subsequent decisions. In
Austin v. State59 the court held that when an information charges both
means of rape disjunctively and the evidence supports both means of
rape, a jury instruction regarding both may be given. 0 In Wood v.
State61 the court held that when the State charges rape by sexual inter-
course based on the defendant's confession and the defendant testifies
at trial that he raped the victim only by deviate sexual activity, the
State may amend the information to include rape by deviate sexual
activity. 2 The court stated that such an amendment does not change
the nature or degree of the crime."
The court has also allowed similar amendments in prosecutions
brought under the Arkansas DWI and theft statutes." Like the rape
statute, these statutes contain disjunctive means of committing the of-
fense. 65 In Yacono v. State" the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the
admission of evidence that was offered to prove a particular means of
violating the DWI statute even though that means was not charged in
the information. Under the applicable statute, one commits a DWI of-
53. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1801 (1977 & Supp. 1985).
54. 278 Ark. at 536-37, 647 S.W.2d at 435.
55. Id. at 538, 647 S.W.2d at 436 (Hickman, J., dissenting).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 537-38, 647 S.W.2d at 435.
58. Id. at 539, 647 S.W.2d at 436.
59. 287 Ark. 256, 697 S.W.2d 914 (1985).
60. Id.
61. 287 Ark. 203, 697 S.W.2d 884 (1985).
62. id. at 204, 697 S.W.2d at 886.
63. Id.
64. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-2503 (Supp. 1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2202 (1977).
65. See supra note 64.
66. 285 Ark. 130, 685 S.W.2d 500 (1985).
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fense by either operating a vehicle while intoxicated or by operating a
vehicle with a blood alcohol content of ten percent or more.67 In
Yacono the court held that a person may be charged with one of these
means and convicted of the other although the evidentiary require-
ments for each are different."
Arkansas has expressly consolidated its theft statute to include va-
rious means of theft.69 Violations that were originally separate theft
offenses are now considered to be only a means of theft.70 The statute
allows one means to be charged and another to be proved, subject to
the power of the court to insure a fair trial and grant relief when the
defendant would be prejudiced by lack of fair notice or surprise.7 1 The
purpose of this consolidation is to prevent a defendant from escaping
conviction because of pleading technicalities .7
With Justice Hickman speaking for the majority, the court in
Cokeley v. State73 expressly overruled its holding in Clayborn v.
State7 4 and held that rape under section 41-1803 of the Arkansas Stat-
utes Annotated is one offense with two means of commission.7 5 In
reaching its decision, the court cited two previous decisions that al-
lowed an amendment to the information when only one means of rape
had been charged.7 The court relied upon Wood v. State77 to support
its holding that such an amendment does not change the nature or de-
gree of the crime.76 The court cited Browning v. State7 9 to support its
holding that when one means of rape has been charged, a general
charge of rape has been made under the statute.0
The court also analogized the rape statute to the Arkansas DWI
statute,6 ' noting that it has construed the DWI statute as one offense
with two means of commission. 2 The court looked to its prior holdings
67. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-2503 (Supp. 1985).
68. 285 Ark. at 132, 685 S.W.2d at 501.
69. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2202 (1977).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2202 (1977) (commentary).
73. 288 Ark. 349, 705 S.W.2d 425 (1986).
74. 278 Ark. 533, 647 S.W.2d 433 (1983).
75. 288 Ark. at 350-51, 705 S.W.2d at 426.
76. Id. at 351, 705 S.W.2d at 426.
77. 287 Ark. 203, 697 S.W.2d 884 (1985).
78. 288 Ark. at 351, 705 S.W.2d at 426.
79. 274 Ark. 13, 621 S.W.2d 688 (1981) (when information charges the defendant with rape
by sexual intercourse, evidence may be entered to show rape by deviate sexual activity).
80. 288 Ark. at 351, 705 S.W.2d at 426.
81. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-2503 (Supp. 1985).
82. 288 Ark. at 352, 705 S.W.2d at 426.
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indicating that a charge under one subsection of the DWI statute is
adequate to charge all subsections even though the evidentiary require-
ments of the subsections differ. 83
The court in Cokeley found no prejudice or surprise to the defend-
ant because the evidence, including the testimony of the defendant,
supported a finding of rape by both means and because the defendant
failed to file a motion for a bill of particulars.""
Justice Dudley dissented, contending that the two kinds of rape
are separate crimes because they are not of the same general charac-
ter.85 He asserted that rape by deviate sexual activity is a gender neu-
tral crime" while rape by sexual intercourse is restricted to heterosex-
ual conduct.8 7 Therefore, Justice Dudley reasoned that the elements of
rape by sexual intercourse do not contain all the elements of rape by
deviate sexual activity.88
The court in Cokeley, in accord with its other post-Clayborn deci-
sions,89 construed the Arkansas rape statute as one offense with two
means of commission." The court has finally clarified its position on
the proper construction of the rape statute.91 There are two essential
elements of rape in Arkansas: sexual contact and forcible compulsion."
Therefore, the state may plead one means of rape and prove the
other.93 This clarity, however, is clouded by dictum in a subsequent
case, Tarry v. State." In Tarry the court stated that if both means of
rape occur in the same episode, the court may impose separate
sentences for each means because the two acts of rape are of a "differ-
ent nature."95 Although the court expressly stated that rape is one of-
fense with two means of commission," the different nature language is
83. 285 Ark. at 132, 685 S.W.2d at 501.
84. 288 Ark. at 353, 705 S.W.2d at 427.
85. 288 Ark. at 353-54, 705 S.W.2d at 427 (Dudley, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 353-54, 705 S.W.2d at 427.
87. Id. at 354, 705 S.W.2d at 427.
88. Id.
89. Austin v. State, 287 Ark. 256, 697 S.W.2d 914 (1985); Wood v. State, 287 Ark. 203,
697 S.W.2d 884 (1985).
90. 288 Ark. at 351, 705 S.W.2d at 426.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 352-53, 705 S.W.2d at 427.
94. 289 Ark. 193, 710 S.W.2d 202 (1986). In Tarry, the defendant raped the victim by
deviate sexual activity and left the room. The defendant soon returned and raped the victim by
sexual intercourse. The court imposed two consecutive sentences, holding that the crime was not
continuous because it was separated in point of time.




more in line with the reasoning used in Clayborn. In Cokeley the deci-
sion that the two means of rape are one offense was based upon the
premise that they do not differ in "nature" or degree.9
The court in Cokeley decided that due process is not violated if a
defendant is charged with one means of rape and convicted of another,
since both means constitute only one offense.98 This decision may run
contrary to the intent of the legislature in passing the rape statute. The
legislature expressly provided in the Arkansas theft statute9' that it was
consolidating several previously separate offenses into one offense and
that a defendant could henceforth be charged with one means and con-
victed of another.100 The Arkansas rape statute gives no such notice.101
The court in Cokeley did not address the issue of whether the legisla-
ture must expressly consolidate separate offenses to ensure that a de-
fendant has sufficient notice that the previously separate offenses are
now one offense. Arguably, since the legislature used express consolida-
tion in the theft statute, it would have done the same if it had intended
to combine the two rape offenses into one.
In Cokeley the court overlooked the State's narrow information
because there was enough evidence to support a conviction of either
means of rape and because the defendant could have requested a bill of
particulars.10' However, it is questionable whether a defendant would
be put on notice to ask for a bill of particulars when the information
specifically charges only one means of the offense. If the court required
the pleadings to accuse both means disjunctively, the defendant would
have more notice to ask for a bill of particulars. This requirement
would take little effort on the part of the prosecuting attorney and
would ensure that notice is given.
Vickie A. Warner
97. 288 Ark. at 351, 705 S.W.2d at 426.
98. Id.
99. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2202 (1977).
100. Id. (commentary).
101. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1803 (1977).
102. 288 Ark. at 353. 705 S.W.2d at 427.
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